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At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This dichotomy encapsulates the core feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—even as this fits with the new air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson echoed this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is significant, but analysts caution it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Neglect and Tensions

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Targeted Intervention

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.